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Abstract: 
 
The introduction of the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM Directive 
2011/61/EU) in 2013 means a radical transformation of the EU regulatory landscape for the 
whole alternative investment fund industry. Taking into account the growing meaning of the 
alternative investment fund industry in Europe, the aim of the paper is to assess the impact 
the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) will have on the 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs) managing Alternative Investment Funds 
(AIFs) in the EU.  
 
The research is based on the case of Malta, which is a quickly growing financial centre. The 
main findings are based on an analysis of questionnaire responses conducted with key 
players in the fund industry regulated and licensed by the Malta Financial Services 
Authority. This study provides an extensive analysis of the AIFMD and its impact on Malta’s 
financial service industry. It has highlighted various factors that will have a positive or 
negative impact on the industry resulting from the AIFMD.  
 
The paper provides recommendations for further development of the Maltese fund industry in 
the context of the AIFMD that can be partially applied to other fund domiciles. 
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Introduction 
 
In June 2011, the European Commission proposed a new Directive (AIFM Directive 
2011/61/EU) on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM). The aim of this 
Directive is to establish common requirements governing the authorization and 
supervision of AIFMs in order to provide a coherent approach to the related risks 
and their impact on investors and markets in the European Union (Directive, 2011).  
 
According to the requirements, the AIFM directive should be in place across the 
whole of the European Union by the end of July 2014, thus establishing an EU-wide 
harmonized framework for monitoring and supervising risks as well as imposing 
more rigorous regulation on alternative investment fund managers. The AIFM 
Directive covers different types of alternative investment funds, e.g., hedge funds, 
private equity funds, real estate funds, retail investment funds, as well as alternative 
investment companies. Thus, this Directive means a radical transformation of the EU 
regulatory landscape for the whole alternative investment fund industry.  
 
The reaction of the investment fund industry was rather equivocal. On one hand, the 
Directive creates a European passport system for alternative investment fund 
managers (AIFMs), thus allowing distribution of these investment funds to 
professional investors. On the other hand, new regulations bring additional work for 
alternative managers to get the processes and procedures in place, especially 
concerning regulatory reporting, depositary requirements, risk management and 
certain disclosures to investors. Besides, some rules are still unclear, like 
remuneration rules of alternative managers. 
 
The AIFM Directive requires enhanced transparency of alternative managers 
(European Commission, 2012) and the investment funds they manage, thus offering 
investors an additional protection and giving more clarity in such important issues 
like taxation of carried interest. On the other hand, assurance of additional 
transparency means extra costs for the alternative fund managers that in most cases 
will be transposed to investors.  
 
Therefore, the new Directive with the imposition of a licensing and regulatory 
compliance framework on the managers of alternative investment funds (AIFs) 
which are marketed or managed in the EU, will have significant implications for 
financial sponsors across the globe, let alone small domiciles such as Malta. The 
Directive introduced some transitional periods, as follows: 
 
 One year transitional period until 22 July, 2014 for existing fund managers / 
self-managed funds to upgrade their licenses into full AIFMs / self-managed 
AIFs or de minimize AIFMs. 
 Non-EU fund managers may continue to manage / market without a passport 
non-EU AIFs / EU AIFs without requiring full AIFMD compliance until 
2015. 
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 AIFMs and AIFs are allowed to engage both local depositaries as well as a 
depositary that is a credit institution in another EU Member State until 22 
July, 2017. 
 
The transposition of the AIFM directive into national legislation might create 
additional advantages to some market players, as the Directive provides some 
discretion for Member States. For example, it allows private placement of non-EU 
alternative investment funds (AIFs) marketed by EU-based alternative investment 
fund managers (AIFMs) and AIFs marketed by non-EU AIFMs. Furthermore EU 
AIFs, especially of the self-managed type, may still benefit from national private 
placement regimes. Thus the final requirements may vary significantly among the 
EU Member States.  
 
Therefore the aim of the paper is to assess the impact AIFMD will have on AIFMs 
managing AIFs in Malta. After over-viewing key concepts associated with the 
AIFMD and possible impacts of this directive on the AIF industry, this paper 
focuses exclusively on the Maltese fund industry.  It investigates various factors that 
might have a positive or negative impact on the industry resulting from the AIFMD. 
Malta is a small island state situated in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea with a 
population of circa 400,000 persons. It is a member of the EU and forms part of the 
Eurozone. Malta’s key economic figures for 2015, when compared to the 17 
countries that have adopted the euro, are shown in the Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1. Malta’s Economic Figures 
 Malta  Euro Area 17  
GDP per capita  EUR 16’100  EUR 28’500  
Economic growth  1%  -0.6%  
Debt-to-GDP  72.1%  90.6%  
Inflation  3.2%  2.5%  
Unemployment rate  6.4%  11.4%  
Source: Eurostat data  
 
Economic growth and stability are highly dependent on financial services (Falzon, 
2011) and so the issues raised in this paper are very important for Malta’s growth as 
well as for other member states that will be influenced by this Directive. The 
findings will be discussed and the study goes to provide recommendations aimed at 
better guiding Maltese authorities to adapt to the changes brought forth by the 
AIFMD and to ensure that the Maltese Fund Industry can continue to grow and 
prosper. Various prominent researchers have used islands as case studies for policy 
and development studies (King, 1993). Hence, the recommendations of this study 
can be also partially applied to other investment fund domiciles. 
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Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
The investment fund industry can be seen as one of the key drivers of financial 
market and the economy as a whole. Several studies point out that investment funds 
facilitate innovations in other sectors of economy (Njegomir & Demko Rihter, 2013; 
Thalassinos et al., 2015), support economic growth and improve social welfare 
(Chou & Chin, 2004). Investment funds accumulate capital, ensure risk 
diversification and provide investors new investment diversification options, 
realizing financial innovations through new assets classes, new asset allocation 
techniques, new risk and returns enhancing tools, new theme funds and new business 
models (Rajan, 2011). Moreover, the alternative investment industry covering hedge 
funds, private equity funds, real estate funds etc. is often seen a benefit for the 
financial market it operates in, enhancing market liquidity and efficiency (e.g., hedge 
funds) as well as expanding sources of available corporate financing (e.g., private 
equity funds) (Ferran, 2011; Rupeika-Apoga and Nedovis, 2015; Fetai, 2015). Thus 
the introduction of the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers will have 
an impact not only on the particular funds, but also on financial markets and 
economies as a whole. 
 
The idea of pan-European regulation of investment funds is not new. In 1985 the 
UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) 
Directive was invented introducing European harmonized investment funds 
(Directive 85/611/ECC, 1985). The aim of the UCITS Directive was to allow 
collective investment schemes to operate freely throughout the European Union on 
the basis of a single authorization from one member state. Later the directive had to 
be applied in all EEA countries, thus including also Iceland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein. This harmonized legal framework had a strong focus on investors’ 
protection and product regulation.  
 
Changing economic environment as well as market pressure gave an incentive to 
ensure further improvement of the investment fund regulatory framework. In 2001 
UCITS III Directives (Directive 2001/107/EC “Management Directive” & Directive 
2001/108/EC “Product Directive”) were introduced enabling wider range of eligible 
assets, extended use of derivatives as well as improved regulation of investment fund 
management companies (Directive 2001/107/EC, 2001; Directive 2001/108/EC, 
2001). Currently the UCITS IV Directive is in place, enabling a simplified 
notification process and key investor information document, regulating cross-border 
merger, providing the possibility to obtain a management company passport, and to 
establish master-feeder structure on a local and cross-border basis etc (Directive 
2009/65/EC, 2009). 
 
Still, the establishment of the pan-European regulatory framework for investment 
funds is an ongoing process. UCITS V proposals are already published (in July 
2012) enhancing regulation of depository regime (including duties, delegation, 
eligibility and liability), rules governing remuneration as well as a sanctions regime. 
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The second step in the establishment of a pan-European regulation of the investment 
fund industry is the introduction of the new Directive on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers (AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU) to establish common requirements 
governing the authorization and supervision of alternative investment fund managers 
and funds. 
 
The consultation paper on key concepts of the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive and types of AIFM published in February 2012 was widely 
discussed (ESMA, 2012) by numerous investment fund industry participants and 
financial experts (Alternative Investment Management Association, Association 
Française de la Gestion financière, Association of Foreign Investment Companies in 
Austria, BVI Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management, EFAMA, 
Investment Management Association, German Banking Industry Committee, ALFI, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and many others).  
 
The introduction of the AIFM Directive in 2013 was taken by the investment fund 
industry rather equivocal. The scope of the Directive is rather broad, including 
management and marketing of AIFs, requirements of AIF managers authorization, 
EU marketing passport, private placement exemptions to professional investors, 
capital requirements, remuneration, risk management, reporting and repository 
requirements. Besides, different rules should be applied depending on whether the 
alternative investment fund and fund manager are based in the EEA or outside EEA. 
 
The impact of the Directive on the investment fund industry is still unclear. Several 
studies conducted by industry professionals have shown that most market 
participants see the AIFM Directive as a threat to their business and competitiveness 
of the industry in Europe (Deloitte, 2012). Besides, the Directive may put some 
alternative investment fund markets in a weak competitive position as an alternative 
fund and management company domicile. The European asset management industry 
employs ca.510, 000 specialists across European countries and has an annual Gross 
value added of 102.6 billion EUR (European Fund and Asset Management 
Association, 2013). Change of competitiveness of domiciles may put it under risk.  
 
According to a survey of UK based asset managers carried out by Deloitte, nearly 
three quarters of respondents see the Directive as a threat to their business and two 
thirds believe that AIFM Directive will reduce competitiveness of the alternative 
investment fund industry in Europe (Deloitte, 2012). Therefore, it is extremely 
important to assess the impact of AFMD on the industry as a whole and on the 
competitiveness of the domiciles affected by it.  
 
The fact that, after the end of the transitional period in 2017, the depositary must be 
located in the AIF’s domicile could also cause concerns in smaller financial centres. 
Furthermore, the rules on depositary liability and responsibilities could lead to 
increasing costs for AIFs and reduction of competition since certain market 
participants could leave the custody market. Thus, the assessment of the possible 
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impact of the AIFM directive is important to provide recommendations to 
maintain/improve competitiveness AIF domiciles. 
 
Research Methodology and Results 
 
The paper investigates the following three research questions empirically: 
 
1. Following the AIFMD, how important will specific incentives be for 
retaining/obtaining an AIF license in Malta? 
2. Following the AIFMD, how important will specific disincentives be for 
retaining/obtaining an AIF license in Malta? 
3. Does the intention to retain/obtain an AIF license in Malta following the 
AIFMD vary as a function of the size of the Fund, whether the Fund 
Manager is already licensed in Malta and whether the Fund Manager has 
a licensed Fund in Malta?  
 
To answer these questions, we targeted all players in the fund industry comprising 
71 Fund Managers and 231 licensed Funds regulated and licensed by the Malta 
Financial Services Authority [MFSA]. Additionally, we targeted potential AIF 
license holders; i.e., those who intend to obtain an AIF license in Malta in the next 
two years (population not available). With no sampling frame available for the latter, 
we resorted to ‘critical-case purposive sampling’ (Saunders, Thornhill, & Lewis, 
2009). Our distribution strategy focused on two fronts – our personal network 
involved in the AIF industry who voluntarily agreed to help us in getting exposure, 
and Linkedin related groups/ forums in which one of the authors has been a member 
for a long time. All the data were gathered via a web-link on kwiksurveys.com and 
no incentives were offered to the participants for answering the questionnaire.  
 
The Research Instrument 
 
The questionnaire entitled ‘Alternative Fund Managers’ Directive and its 
Implications for Malta’ consisted of:  
 
- 5 closed ended demographic variables regarding the Fund Manager’s 
Fund and license (e.g., ‘Is the Fund Manager Licensed in Malta?’).  
- 22 randomly ordered, five point Likert-style questions ranging from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ comprising 11 incentives for 
retaining/obtaining an AIF license in Malta following the AIFMD (e.g., 
‘Lower running costs in Malta [e.g., legal/administration/authorization 
fees] when compared with other established jurisdictions’) and 11 
disincentives for retaining/obtaining an AIF license in Malta following 
the AIFMD (e.g., ‘Lack of internationally established 
custodians/depositaries’). Some of these statements were adapted from 
various sources that we consulted during the literature search, e.g., 
MFSA publications (MFSA, 2013), Kinetic Partners (Kinetic Partners, 
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2013), Deloitte (Deloitte, 2012), Ernst & Young (Ernst & Young, 2013) 
while others were designed by the authors following discussion with 
experts in the field.  
- another 3 five-point Likert type items regarding the Fund or Fund 
Manager’s intention to retain/obtain a license in Malta following the 
AIFMD (e.g., ‘The AIFMD will not affect the Fund/Fund Manager 
decision to retain/obtain the AIF license in Malta’), the latter being 
restricted to those Fund Managers who had a licensed fund or a Fund 
Manager license in Malta.  
 
The respondents were able to amend their responses until the questionnaire was 
completed, while the software allowed one respondent per IP address, thereby 
helping prevent multiple completions from the same respondent or from the same 
Fund Manager. We stressed that there were no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to the 
statements, that confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed, and that the 
individual responses would be used for research purposes to help see the ‘big 
picture’. The questionnaire took approximately 10 minutes to complete.  
 
Data Analysis Procedures 
 
To answer the first two research questions, we started by generating descriptive 
statistics for each of the 11 incentives and 11 disincentives using the median (Md), 
the range (R), the mean (M), the standard deviation (SD) and mean rank (MR). To 
test for difference in mean ranks across the various ordinal scales, we conducted the 
Friedman test. In the presence of a significant χ2 statistic in the Friedman test, we 
computed a series of Wilcoxon tests as post-hoc tests, applying the Bonferroni 
correction to avoid the problem of inflating the Type 1 error due to multiple 
comparisons (Miller, 1991).  
 
To answer the third research question, we used stepwise multiple regression. 
‘Intention to retain/obtain the License in Malta following AIFMD’ was included as 
the dependent variable, while ‘size of Fund’, whether or not ‘the Fund manager is 
already licensed in Malta’ and whether or not ‘the Fund manager has a licensed fund 
in Malta’ were included as independent variables. Before interpreting the results, we 
ensured that the assumptions of no autocorrelation in the residuals and 
multicollinearity were not violated by means of the Durbin-Watson statistic and the 
VIFs respectively.  
 
Sample Characteristics 
 
A total of 299 persons responded to our invitation during the February 2014. From 
these, the responses of 29 participants were discarded because one of the following 
three requirements was not met: (1) Fund Manager was already licensed in Malta, 
(2) the Fund was licensed in Malta, and (3) the Fund or Fund Manager had the 
intention to obtain a new license in Malta within the next two years. Thus, 270 
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complete surveys formed the basis of the statistical analysis. Of these, 38 (14.1%) 
have a Fund Manager license in Malta, 112 (41.5%) have a licensed fund in Malta, 
and the remaining 120 (44.4%) represented prospective AIF license holders. 173 
(64.1%) respondents have the Fund Manager licensed in the EU. Also, 137 (50.7%) 
reported that the size of the Fund (Assets under Management) was below 100 
million euro with the remaining 133 (49.3%) reporting that the size of the Fund was 
between 100 million and 250 million euro. No Fund in the sample exceeded 250 
million euro in Assets under Management including leverage.  
 
Table 2 exhibits the population and sample distributions by license type. The sample 
size of 150 for Fund managers of Funds licensed in Malta (which excluded the 120 
prospective AIF license holders) already exceeded the a-priori minimum sample size 
of 30 for the Friedman test and associated Wilcoxon post-hoc tests (Green & 
Salkind, 2008). It also exceeded the minimum a-priori sample size of 112 for 
multiple regression for the following pre-set criteria - three predictors, desired 
statistical power of 0.8, Type 1 error rate of 0.05, and an anticipated effect size of 
0.10 (Soper, 2014).    
 
A Chi-squared test of independence revealed that the population and sample 
distributions by license type did not differ significantly from each other (χ2(1) = 
0.008, p = 0. 930). This confirmed the representativeness of our sample, thereby 
increasing our confidence in making generalizations for the sample to the population 
in question. Since MFSA was not in a position to provide us a list of prospective 
AIF licence holders due to Data Protection, they had to be excluded from the Chi-
squared analysis of independence. 
 
Table 2. Population and sample distributions by license type 
Licence Type Population Sample 
Have a Fund Manager licence in Malta 73 (25.5%) 38 (25.3%) 
Have Licenced Fund(s) in Malta 213 (74.5%) 112 (74.7%) 
Total 286 (100.0%) 150 (100.0%) 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey made. 
      
Following the AIFMD, how important will specific incentives be for 
retaining/obtaining an AIF license in Malta? 
 
The Friedman test revealed that that the incentives (N = 11) differed significantly 
with respect to their mean ranks (χ2 (10) = 1725.30, N = 238, p < 0.001). In fact, the 
most important incentive (Md= 5) that emerged was that the running costs in Malta 
would be lower than in other established jurisdictions. Other important incentives 
(Md = 4) that emerged were ‘tax incentives’, ‘Malta as a member of the EU 
(including EU passport)’, ‘the Financial Services infrastructure and robust Financial 
Services Regulator’,  and ‘the economic climate in Malta’. A summary of 
descriptive statistics and post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests is 
presented in Table 3 below. 
    Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive and its Impact on Malta’s Financial 
Service Industry 
78 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Summary (Incentives) 
Incentives for obtaining/retaining an 
AIF Licence  
following AIFMD 
MR MD (R) M SD WPHT* 
Lower running costs in Malta when 
compared to other established jurisdictions 
9.47 5 (2-5) 4.55 1.05 A 
Tax incentives 9.07 4 (3-5) 4.17 0.44 B 
Malta being a member of the EU 
(including EU passport) 
8.72 4 (3-5) 4.03 0.28 C 
The Financial Services infrastructure and 
robust Regulator 
7.84 4 (3-4) 3.84 0.37 D 
The economic climate in Malta 7.20 4 (3-4) 3.70 0.46 E 
The legal system in Malta 5.27 3 (3-4) 3.20 0.40 F 
The political climate in Malta 4.62 3 (3-4) 3.05 0.23 G 
Availability of multi-lingual personnel 4.62 3 (3-4) 3.05 0.23 G 
Maltese culture and history (UK traditional 
banking culture) 
4.41 3 (3-3) 3.00 0.00 H 
The technological infrastructure 2.70 2 (2-4) 2.41 0.59 I 
The productivity of the labour force 2.09 2 (2-4) 2.28 0.56 J 
WPHT = Wilcoxon post-hoc tests; * different letters signify statistically significant 
differences between groups (p < 0.001) following Bonferroni correction 
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey made. 
 
Following the AIFMD, how important will specific disincentives be for 
retaining/obtaining an AIF license in Malta? 
 
The Friedman test revealed that that the disincentives (N = 11) also differed 
significantly with respect to their mean ranks (χ2 (10) = 1082.384, N = 238, p < 
0.001). In fact, the most important disincentives (Md = 4) were ‘insufficient number 
of custodians/depositaries’, ‘lack of internationally established 
custodians/depositaries’ and ‘the marketing of AIFs to non-professional investors’.   
A summary of descriptive statistics and post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks tests is presented in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Summary 
(Disincentives) 
Disincentives for obtaining/retaining an 
AIF Licence  
following AIFMD 
MR MD (R) M SD WPHT* 
Insufficient number of 
custodians/depositaries 
9.04 4 (3-4) 3.97 0.16 A 
Lack of internationally established 
custodians/depositaries 
8.85 4 (3-4) 3.92 0.27 A,B 
The marketing of AIFs to non-professional 
investors 
8.41 4 (2-5) 3.87 0.71 B 
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Fund manager needs to comply with 
AIFMD even if fund is 
smaller than € 100 million 
5.82 3 (3-5) 3.42 0.73 C 
No passporting possibilities currently 
available for depositories /custodians 
5.14 3 (3-5) 3.29 0.70 D 
Increased custody costs due to additional 
responsibilities of 
custodian (depositary) 
5.02 3 (2-5) 3.00 0.71 D,E 
Insufficient availability of qualified risk 
managers in Malta 
4.89 3 (3-4) 3.13 0.34 E 
Requirement of professional indemnity 
insurance and 
associated costs 
4.89 3 (3-4) 3.13 0.34 E 
Possible negative impact of tax 
harmonisation within EU member states on 
Malta’s current favourable tax regime 
4.87 3 (2-5) 3.23 0.76 E 
The harmonisation of the definition of 
professional investor under AIFMD 
4.87 3 (2-5) 3.23 0.76 E 
Malta’s immature (embryonic) Fund 
Industry when compared to traditional 
centres 
4.21 3 (3-3) 3.00 0.00 F 
WPHT = Wilcoxon post-hoc tests; *different letters signify statistically significant 
differences between groups  
(p < 0.001) following Bonferroni correction 
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey made. 
 
Does the intention to retain/obtain an AIF licence in Malta following the AIFMD 
vary as a function of the size of the Fund, whether the Fund Manager is already 
licensed in Malta and whether the Fund Manager has a licensed Fund in Malta? 
 
In the survey, we asked those who currently have a licensed Fund and/or a Fund 
Manager license in Malta to rate their level of agreement with three five-point 
Likert-type items concerning their intention to retain/obtain a license in Malta 
following the AIFMD. Since the measures pertaining to these three items were 
internally consistent (Cronbach α = 0.845) and loaded on a single factor in Principal 
Component Analysis (Eigen-value (λ) = 2.09, % of variance = 69.53) we summed 
the scores of each participant together and found the average score, to obtain the 
‘Intention’ scale (dependant variable in stepwise multiple regression analysis). 
 
Stepwise multiple regression analysis revealed that the intention to retain/obtain a 
License in Malta following the AIFMD was significantly predicted by possession 
(No/Yes) of a licensed fund in Malta. In fact, those Fund Managers who currently 
have a licensed Fund in Malta (β = 0.316, t = 3.59, p <0.001) have a greater 
intention to retain a License in Malta following the AIFMD. ‘Size of Fund’ (β = 
0.131, t = 1.38, p = 0.17) and possession of a Fund Manager licence (No/Yes) in 
Malta’ (β = 0.015, t = 0.16, p = 0.88) did not have a significant impact on ‘intention’ 
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and so these variables were excluded from the model.  Table 5 below provides a 
summary of the stepwise multiple regression output. 
 
Table 5. Stepwise Multiple Regression Coefficients Table 
Model
a
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Toleran
ce 
VIF 
1 
(Constant) 3.000 .156  19.232 .000   
Licensed fund in 
Malta 
.574 .160 .316 3.587 .000 1.000 1.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Intention; ‘Has AIF in Malta’ (No = ‘0’, yes = ‘1’)  
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey made. 
 
With respect to the statistical assumptions of regression analysis, it is worth noting 
that with one regressor, multicollinearity is not an issue (Field, 2009). With one 
regressor, an intercept in the model and a sample size of 118, the observed Durbin-
Watson statistic (d = 2.24) was greater than 2. Hence, we tested the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation in the residuals versus negative first-order autocorrelation at 
the 5% level of significance. We computed 4-d (= 1.76) and compared the result 
with the tabulated 5% significance points of dL = 1.654 and dU = 1.694 (Savin & 
White, 1977). Since 1.76 is higher than 1.694, we retained the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. 
 
Discussion 
 
The first goal of this study was to determine the importance of specific incentives for 
Fund Managers and Funds in obtaining/retaining an AIF License in Malta following 
the AIFMD. The most important incentive that emerged was that the running costs 
in Malta will still remain lower than in other established jurisdictions. This gives 
Malta the advantage of cost competitiveness and its effect is expected to be most 
pronounced with start-up fund managers, although more established fund managers 
looking to relocate to Malta would also be expected to consider this advantage 
positively.  
 
Malta is known to provide high quality and efficient services and hence one can gain 
global brand service provisions from tier two service providers at very competitive 
prices without losing on quality. Such costs include renting, legal fees, 
telecommunication and IT services costs, Audit fees and a well-trained and 
productive staff complement. The second most important incentive for 
obtaining/retaining an AIF licence following the AIFMD was related to tax 
incentives.  
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Although the taxation of funds itself is zero or near zero in the most important 
European fund domiciles, and the VAT exemption for investment management is 
settled EU case-law, Malta’s advantage lies in its full imputation system of taxation 
which avoids double taxation of corporate profits. In addition, a number of tax 
treaties further enhance Malta’s offering. Tax incentives help to reduce 
discrimination with countries that are already attractive, and this makes sense in the 
context of a small island state like Malta (Bezzina, Falzon & Zammit, 2012, p. 595).  
 
In fact, Maltese authorities continuously conduct a rethinking of tax incentives to 
ensure that they at least match those offered by other competing domiciles. The third 
most important incentive selected was that Malta is a member of the EU. This 
provides Fund Managers and Funds the opportunity for EU pass-porting, enhances 
transparency and standardization, and reduces the possibility of regulatory arbitrage 
among jurisdictions. The fourth important incentive concerned the financial services 
regulator (MFSA) in Malta, which is slowly but steadily developing into one of the 
most robust yet business-oriented regulators in the EU.  The fifth important incentive 
related to the economic climate in Malta. The way in which the Maltese economy 
went unscathed through the recent global financial crisis provides clear evidence of 
the resilience of the Maltese economy.  
 
In fact, Malta did not have to resort to any bank bailouts and its banking system has 
been ranked as the 13th most solvent out of 144 countries (World Economic Forum, 
2013). Additionally, a recent study by Bezzina, Grima and Mamo (2014, in press) 
shows that Maltese financial firms have sound risk management practices that link 
positively with added value and principled performance. 
 
The second goal of this study was to determine the importance of specific 
disincentives for Fund Managers and Funds in obtaining/retaining an AIF Licence in 
Malta following the AIFMD. The two most important disincentives that were ranked 
on par concerned AIFMD requirements - the ‘insufficient number of 
custodians/depositaries’, and the ‘lack of internationally established 
custodians/depositaries’. It is clear that Malta needs a quick solution to its depositary 
offering. Malta needs to attract depositaries that are open for the wide array of 
alternative investments and fund sizes. The problem here is that although Malta has 
a few big names, they have been reluctant to act as custodians of a certain size or 
type of investment.  
 
A possible solution to this problem would be to encourage the European 
Commission to push relentlessly forward its plans for a pan-European passport for 
the depositary, thus allowing depositaries to provide cross-border services. This is a 
missing link in the European integration of financial markets.  
 
However, Maltese authorities do not seem to be in favor of this proposal, arguing 
that it is not exactly in line with the spirit of the requirements. The other factor that 
emerged as an important disincentive was ‘the marketing of AIFs to non-
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professional investors’. The results of the questionnaire show that AIFMD is 
generating interest from medium to smaller managers who are attracted to the 
possibility of a European passport to market their fund to professional investors 
across the EU. However the authors consider that the current legislation is too 
polarized between professional investors and retail investors. There exists another 
category of investor that is wealthy enough not to be considered as retail, yet would 
not meet the strict criteria of a professional investor. Within that space, marketing 
will still be dominated by national rules which were left unharmonized by AIFMD. 
Here Malta’s role will be to reach out to other European regulators and gain an even 
better understanding of national private placement rules in order to be able to offer 
solutions for the benefit of Fund Managers and Funds in Malta. 
 
An unexpected finding in relation to disincentives following the AIFMD was that 
the limited number of risk managers on the Island did not emerge as a preoccupation 
for the respondents. Possible explanations could be that most of the Fund Managers 
and Funds already have a strong setup for this function and so the lack of risk 
managers on the island will not impact negatively on their decision.  
 
In this regard, the MFSA’s training arm, the Malta International Training Centre 
(MITC), the Malta Association of Risk Management (MARM), the University of 
Malta and other private institutions have been providing training courses and 
seminars over the last three years to fill this gap. Additionally, MFSA is currently 
exploring additional/alternative initiatives in this regard to boost the number of 
qualified risk managers on the Island. 
 
The third and final goal of this study was to determine whether the intention to 
obtain/retain a Fund Manager license and/or a Fund license in Malta following the 
AIFMD varied as a function of the size of the Fund, possession of a Fund Manager 
license in Malta, or possession a Fund license in Malta. The analysis revealed that 
those who have a fund licensed in Malta are more likely to obtain/retain their licence 
after the AIFMD than others who do not have a fund. Further scrutiny of the data 
revealed that this was due to Fund Managers licensed in Malta who still do not have 
any funds under management, and this might have negatively impacted their 
outlook. This finding however warrants further investigation before any strong 
conclusions may be drawn. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study provides a comprehensive picture of the importance of specific incentives 
and disincentives for Fund Managers and Funds in obtaining or retaining an AIF 
license in Malta following the AIFMD. Firstly, four specific incentives emerged as 
important in attracting Fund Managers and Funds to obtain/retain an AIF license in 
Malta following the AIFMD; namely, lower running costs, tax incentives, the stable 
economic climate, and EU pass porting. Secondly, three specific disincentives in 
obtaining/retaining an AIF License following the AIFMD are identified: namely, an 
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insufficient number of custodians/depositaries, a lack of internationally established 
custodians/depositaries and the marketing of AIFs to non-professional investors. 
Thirdly, the study shows those who already have a licensed fund in Malta had a 
greater intention to obtain/retain an AIF license following the AIFMD, with the size 
of fund and possession of a Fund manager license not producing any impact on 
intention. 
 
In the light of the findings, various proposals have need highlighted. Of particular 
importance are (i) the need to attract custodians that are open for the wide array of 
alternative investments and fund sizes, and (ii) that private placement rules include 
another category of investors that is in between the profession and the retail investor. 
Such proposals could better guide Maltese authorities to reduce the impact of the 
AIFMD on the Maltese fund industry and to help it develop successfully in the 
coming years. The conclusions and recommendations of this study can be also 
partially applied to other investment fund domiciles. 
 
There are some limitations to the findings, however, that should be noted. First, the 
data used in this study were gathered from a single jurisdiction (Malta) and so it was 
not possible to make cross-jurisdiction comparisons. Second, the findings are based 
on a survey and we are not in a position to verify that a non-questionnaire approach 
would have generated similar findings. Third, the dis/incentives specified in this 
study for obtaining/retaining an AIF license may not be exhaustive and there may be 
other important factors that could be investigated in future studies.  
 
Despite these limitations, some interesting avenues for further research emerge. For 
instance, it would be interesting to conduct this study in other jurisdictions to 
facilitate cross-jurisdiction comparisons. Additionally, further research is required to 
determine the types of initiatives required to attract the establishment of depositories 
in Malta that accept custody of smaller funds with different underlying investments 
or profiles, and to find ways of increasing the redomiciliation of non EU funds to the 
EU. 
 
To remain attractive, Malta needs to make sure that the reasons that attracted Fund 
Managers and Funds to Malta are be kept in place and possibly improved when these 
managers take the step up to comply with AIFMD.  The Maltese requirements for 
fund managers are already largely compliant with AIFMD. The MFSA and other 
institutions and Associations such as MARM and Finance Malta must keep working 
in tandem to devote all possible resources to help Fund Managers to make it through 
the transition period so that the AIFMD would have an overall positive impact on 
Malta’s fund industry. 
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